Restoring Reason and Civility to the Judicial Selection Process by Smolla, Rodney A.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 39
Issue 3 Allen Chair Symposium 2004 Federal Judicial
Selection
Article 2
3-2005
Restoring Reason and Civility to the Judicial
Selection Process
Rodney A. Smolla
University of Richmond School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Judges Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons
This Introduction is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rodney A. Smolla, Restoring Reason and Civility to the Judicial Selection Process, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 793 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol39/iss3/2
INTRODUCTION
RESTORING REASON AND CIVILITY TO THE
JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
Rodney A. Smolla *
Few subjects of academic and public policy inquiry are more
pressing on the fate and health of the nation than the process by
which our democracy selects the members of its non-democratic
branch, the judiciary. Appointments to federal courts, particu-
larly to the Supreme Court of the United States, have become in-
creasingly fractious, politicized, and partisan. The appointment
wars have become enveloped in the culture wars.
In the aftermath of the two presidential election victories of
President George W. Bush, the national map is now commonly
colored as "red" and "blue." We have red and blue states. Do we as
a nation want to think of the judicial selection process in the
same red and blue hues? Are senators red and blue? Are Supreme
Court nominees red and blue?
Those who are content with a red and blue confirmation proc-
ess have any number of justifications to proffer. One is a kind of
fatalistic historical determinism. The confirmation process ought
to be partisan and cut-throat; the thought goes, because it is par-
tisan and cut-throat. This is history; this is what the process has
become-and there is no turning back the clock. There is a cynical
sense in some quarters that war is war, and all is fair. Besides,
the other side started it.
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My own view is that while we may not be able to turn back the
clock, for the good of the country we ought to move the clock for-
ward. Let us call a cease-fire and disarm.
What might peace look like? I invite the reader to examine
carefully the very thoughtful historical, political, theoretical, and
legal insights of the contributors to this Symposium, and join in
the national dialogue. We ought not pick Supreme Court Justices,
or any federal judges, through resort to a discourse laced with
glib euphemism, political slogans, or demonization.
Invoking the wisdom of Martin Luther King, Jr., we ought to
measure the suitability of nominees by the content of their char-
acter. The touchstone should be character, not caricature.
Most critically, ideology ought not matter unless a nominee's
views are demonstrably outside the perimeter of acceptable legal
thought. This makes it appropriate to reserve as legitimate a
senatorial rejection power in the extraordinary case in which a
president has nominated a true maverick. Never say never. But
in my view it ought not be deemed proper for a senator to vote
"no" merely because the senator's prediction of the nominee's fu-
ture judicial performance leads the senator to conclude that he or
she would not agree with the nominee's likely voting pattern.
Something more ought to be required.
If a nominee is otherwise well-qualified, my own view is that a
senator ought to stand down and vote "yes" if the senator simply
thinks that the senator, if he or she were on the same court as the
nominee, would dissent from the nominee's opinions.
Why do I take this view? Admittedly, it is a tough position to
swallow, for it means accepting on a court-on the Supreme
Court in crucial cases-a voice that may change the fundamental
direction of the country on some issue of profound importance. I
believe, however, that there are larger values at stake.
The nomination wars exact a terrible, corrosive toll on the
quality of our public discourse and on our respect for the rule of
law. I am enough of a realist to accept that ideology and politics
inevitably influence a jurist's disposition and rulings. Yet, I am
enough of an idealist to believe that the judicial process is not and
ought not become mere politics in disguise.
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The more our political and opinion leaders politicize the nomi-
nation process, the more we politicize the law. The more we poli-
ticize the law, the more we weaken it, in substance and symbol.
In the fine articles that follow, you will find many different
perspectives on these issues, and I have learned much from them.
I hope you will also. On behalf of all who are connected with the
law school, I wish to thank the Allen family for its generous sup-
port, and thank my faculty, colleagues, and Law Review members
for all the terrific work that made this Symposium possible.

